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Theatre and the law: a dramaturgical analysis of Comcare v PVYW
Abstract
The law and theatre are uniquely entwined. The traditionalist notion of the law being an entirely
intellectual exercise has, in some ways, limited its application. The law consistently uses techniques that
explore knowledge through the use of the body, whether we realise it or not.
Within the purview of Gageler J’s dissent in the case Comcare v PVYW, this article sought to explore
methods that engage the use of the body to be able to understand, interpret and apply the law. This
exploration used a range of dramaturgical techniques to reappraise the case. For example, it examines
key legal principles by physically representing them. This included ideas such as precedent and court
hierarchy. By doing so, it opened a window to explore the way in which we can understand the law and its
relationship to humanness beyond the intellectual. Interestingly, this process produced a number of
conclusions. It exposed that the application of dramaturgy to the law can act as a bridge to close the gap
between the obscurity of the law and the people that interact with it. As practitioners of the law,
sometimes it is easy to forget it’s audience – human beings. It can become so convoluted that it alienates
a broad section of its audience but it is through these techniques that we can at least realise this pitfall.
This process also challenged the assumptions that are made about the law and, more broadly, it has
promoted the importance of legal practitioners to look beyond their own experiences to better understand
the holistic effect the law.

This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol25/iss1/5

Theatre and the law: a dramaturgical
analysis of Comcare v PVYW
Ryan Roberts1
1 Introduction
Theatre and the law are inextricably linked. Unknowingly, performative
techniques are used to formulate judgments within the legal system. It
is of fundamental importance that the legal profession, and the people
whom take part in that profession, go beyond engaging with the law as
an entirely intellectual pursuit. As Calder and Cowan explain, through
the use of our bodies ‘we can reflect on our thinking about legal
concepts and tools’ (2008: 109). The understanding of the body within
the legal context allows us to re-imagine, and re-apply, ingrained values
that appear to be so rigid. The recognition of physicality can also play
a critical role in learning the law. An ‘embodied pedagogical approach
makes learning the law a more fully human experience and brings to
light questions ... that are often neglected or cannot be seen through
traditional legal pedagogy’ (Badyal 2014:5). The introduction of
theatrical concepts and practices can promote more equitable outcomes
in the analysis and application of the law because it reinvigorates the
traditionalist discourse and practice that underlies legal judgments.
Prior to delving into the specifics, it should be understood that
the theatrical analysis of the law advanced here does not relate to
drama. In this case, the term theatre relates to the way we respond to
the law ‘through our bodies’ (Leiboff 2020: 8). This is an important
Law Text Culture Vol 25 202100
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distinction because the analysis will not look at the portrayal of the
law in drama, but rather, the interaction between the body and the
intellect in understanding the law within the frame of a legal judgment.
A common misconception promoted in discussions about theatre and
the law is that law and theatre are diametric opposites: the theatrical
realm uses tools such as physicality, emotion and feeling to reach an
understanding whereas the law tells itself it must be strictly contained
within the confines of the intellectual realm (Leiboff 2020). This is not
the case. In fact, the law is dependent – as theatre is – upon physicality,
emotionality and feeling; as such, the recognition of theatre within the
legal context is important because theatrical practice can provide new
mechanisms to interpret and apply legal principles, as an application
of theatrical jurisprudence.
Theatrical jurisprudence reminds us that thinking of law as a
rationally crafted and broadly framed principle can miss the liveness
and liveliness of judgment and the circumstances that led to the shaping
of the principle. This article will work theatrically with a decision
of the superior court in Australia, the High Court, which created a
broad principle that limited the ability of an employee to be afforded
workers’ compensation, delimiting the broad scope of an earlier case,
Hatzimanolis, that took an expansive approach towards workers’
compensation protection for employees required to be away from home
for work. But rather than focus on the majority position, this article
will work theatrically with the judgment of a dissentient. This article
will focus on Gageler J’s dissent in Comcare v PV YW.

Let’s begin like real lawyers and focus on what we are assumed
to know. In this case, the respondent (PVYW) was an employee of a
‘Commonwealth government agency’ (Comcare: 1). She was required to
travel to a ‘regional office’ with a colleague for work purposes (Comcare:
1). To complete this work, PVYW was required to stay overnight in
a motel ‘booked by her employer’ (Comcare: 1). During the evening,
the respondent ‘engaged in sexual intercourse with an acquaintance’
(Comcare: 1). Whilst this occurred, a light above the bed ‘was pulled
from its mount’ and hit the respondent ‘on her nose and mouth’
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(Comcare: 1). As a result, the respondent claimed compensation from
Comcare – a workers’ compensation insurer for the Commonwealth of
Australia – for the physical and psychological injuries resulting from
the incident. Comcare initially accepted this argument and PVYW
was awarded compensation for the damages. In 2010, however, the
insurer decided to revoke PVYW’s claim. This set into motion a series
of cases that made their way through the court hierarchy. In 2013,
the majority of the High Court of Australia reached the decision that
PVYW was not entitled to compensation because ‘the injury was not
caused through an activity encouraged or induced by the employer’
(Jessup and McIlwraith 2015: 1485). However, Gageler J concluded
that the respondent was entitled to compensation. Despite the fact that
‘[t]he overnight stay between working hours was an interval within that
overall period of work’, PVYW was at the motel because ‘her employer
encouraged her to be’ (Comcare: 6). Based on this assessment, Gageler J
rationalised that the activity met the requirements of inducement by the
employer and therefore the overnight stay fell within the ambits of the
applicant’s employment, following the precedent of Hatzimanolis v ANI
Corporation, where a worker ‘sustained an injury during a sightseeing
journey on his day off’ (Hatzimanolis: 1). The sightseeing tour was
organised by the employer. The court held that the employer was liable
because the worker ‘sustained injury during an interval occurring
within an overall period’ of employment and because the activity was
organised, and encouraged, by the employer (Hatzimanolis: 1).

Adopting the insights of theatrical jurisprudence and using a
dramaturgical reappraisal (Leiboff 2020), this article will focus on the
assumptions made by Gageler J throughout his dissent. Specifically, it
will look at the discussion on the role of respecting precedent within
the judicial framework; the importance of context in understanding
the law; and the role of the courts in the creation and maintenance of
precedence. The analysis will explore the structure of Gageler J’s dissent
and look at the use of precedence as narratives that contextualise the
judicial decision-making process, and in doing so will reveal a very
different image of the case.
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It will help to know something about why I am looking at this case
in this way, and as it unfolds, how it plays on me. It developed out of
an elective course I took as part of my law degree, ‘Theatricalising
Law’, run by Leiboff. As part of this course, I took a case I had
studied in another context to rethink it using techniques based in
theatrical jurisprudence. I chose this case and this judgment for two
reasons. Firstly, it illuminates some interesting assumptions about
the operation of the law, with particular focus on the development of
precedent and the court’s role in that process. These assumptions can be
dramaturgically analysed, and embodied, which will expose how bodily
experiences can change the meaning associated with different elements
of the law. Furthermore, I chose this case because it demonstrates
normalcy. Whilst the ratio is considered to be quite important within
Australian common law, this case represents a very typical assessment
by the judges, at least in terms of the way they each reached their own
conclusions. This case has some very important legal principles, but
its lexicon is relatively uniform in relation to legal text more generally.
This illustrates that dramaturgical analysis can provide new insights
even in the most stereotypical analyses of the law. It does not need to
be a particularly rare case to show the impact that the theatre has on
understanding, and applying, legal principles.
I want you to know what will happen next. My analysis will
be divided into six distinct parts. The first part will explain the
dramaturgical approach utilised and the significance of this approach.
The second part will establish the dramaturgical practices used to
reappraise the case and the reasons behind the use of these different
practices. The third part will apply theatre theory to Gageler J’s dissent
and expose the impact performative techniques had on understanding
the law. The fourth part will provide an account of the workshopping
process undertaken as I faced different problems and came to new
realisations. The fifth part will reflect on this process. The last part will
outline some of the important conclusions that emerged as a result of
the dramaturgical analysis of the case. By the end, I want you to know,
I have uncovered a great deal about Gageler J’s dissent, but even more
about me, which is just what the theatrical demands of us. I put my
116
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own body on the line, and I will take you with me now.
2 The dramaturgical approach to case analysis
Through a dramaturgical approach to case analysis, I attempted to
understand the way theatrical techniques assist in reading the Comcare
case. This process involved reading the judgment whilst applying
techniques such as striking out; audience perspective; spontaneity;
interpretive assumptions; emotion; silence; physical barriers; and
physical embodiment. The use of each of these techniques revealed
both the way that theatre interacts with the court judgment and the
way that legal perspective can be influenced, and improved, by applying
theatrical techniques. A by-product of the dramaturgical approach is
that it exposed the interrelationship between the law and the people
that engage with it. The dramaturgical reading of the case and the use
of theatrical techniques in the practice of case analysis is significant
because it provides a practical example of how dramaturgy impacts
the interpretation and understanding of the Comcare case – and legal
cases more broadly – and also points to the way in which theatre in its
various forms interacts with legal text.
This dramaturgical approach is informed by research in the nascent
field of law and performance studies. Richard Schechner points
out that ‘human beings with our prodigious forebrains are always
proposing, imagining, creating, playing, performing, and trying to
bring into material existence new realities’ (1994: 397). This is a result
of an insatiable need to assert our ‘cultural spaces’ (Schechner 1994:
398) upon our reality. Theatre plays a crucial role in bringing these
realities into existence. Julie Stone Peters applies Schechner’s ideas to
demonstrate the existence of theatricality within the law. In ‘Legal
Performance Good and Bad’, Peters establishes Derrida and Legendre’s
understanding of law, which is that ‘[it] is (mythically) created through
a performative violence’ (2008: 196). Subsequently, the law’s ‘power
to coerce’ (2008: 196) comes from the theatrical rituals that underlie
the performative violence. She also, however, points to the value of
performance in creating new perspectives:
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[Performance] offers collective catharsis, resists formalist textualism,
allows one to reconstitute one’s identity free from legal strictures, and
gives non-verbal language to the illiterate and inarticulate so that, in
the new media age, law is at last in the hands of the people (Peters
2008: 197)

My approach is informed by this concept of performance that
disavows legal strictures and utilises non-verbal and embodied methods
to articulate a legal analysis. In the next section, I will explore the
particular theatrical and dramaturgical practices used in this case
analysis.
3 Dramaturgical practices used
I began my case analysis by examining the text, reappraising the
judgment by identifying the assumptions that the judge made about
the operation of the law. I first considered the judge’s personal history.
Gageler J grew up in a small town of about 150 people in the Upper
Hunter Valley of New South Wales called Sandy Hollow. He had a
very modest upbringing. He, ‘his two brothers and a sister were raised
on a four-hectare property that contained a sawmill and two houses,
one for their family and one for their grandparents’ (Feneley 2009).
In an interview, he comments on the simple, but meaningful, tasks
that he was exposed to from an early age. He explains having odd jobs
around the sawmill and describes his time at ‘Giants Creek Primary,
a one-teacher shack about 3 kilometres from Sandy Hollow’ (Feneley
2009). Gageler J has been described by his colleagues as ‘extremely
modest’ (Feneley 2009). I suggest that this short biography provides
something that helps us understand something of the assumptions
that he makes about the law, particularly in regards to how he read
and understood precedent in this particular case. So too his experience
as a Commonwealth Solicitor-General, working with employees who
would be required to be away from home for work, to a greater or lesser
degree, likely influenced his thinking.
Throughout the judgment, Gageler J makes some broad assumptions
about how the law should operate. He insists that judges play a crucial
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role in creating law but believes ‘a cautious, incremental approach to
the law is appropriate’ (Feneley 2009). He discusses the importance
of precedent by analysing its development and role within the law.
He also dissects the Court’s role in the maintenance and enforcement
of precedent. However, he also expresses an understanding that the
judiciary has a function of creating law. This is quite a progressive
perspective that subverts the traditional concept of the judiciary
as nothing more than the interpreters of law. Understanding the
biographic background of the judge-as-author is important because
realising why we understand legal concepts in the way we do, simply
observing our own assumptions, can change the way in which we
understand the law and make decisions; in turn, it can invite us to reenvisage the legal principles by which we make decisions. Of course,
this biographic account – a nod to the liveness of the theatrical – will
not alone answer questions about why Gageler J dissented and the
importance of precedent to his decision-making, but it does assist in
contextualising his approach to the law.
The next step in the process was to consider the judgment’s
structure. When reading the dissent, it became apparent that the text is
very deliberately structured. It starts off with an introduction; followed
by the case law before Hatzimanolis; then a description of Hatzimanolis
and the importance of its principles; and finally, the application of those
principles to facts before the Court in this new case. This structure is
almost fabular (Carpi and Leiboff 2016) in nature. Essentially, each
of the precedents are a story that help define the way the law will then
relate to the circumstances at hand. Marett Leiboff describes this as:
the common law’s practice of extracting law and legal principles from
a vibrant and lived experience that is rendered a carapace, based on
the premise that the principles contained in cases speak for themselves
time out of mind (Carpi and Leiboff 2016: 34).

The lived experiences, in this case, are the precedents that shaped
Gageler J’s reasoning. For example, in paragraph 115, the judge begins
to explain the Hatzimanolis principles by examining the history that
preceded that case. He states:
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The pre-Hatzimanolis course of authority ... straddled a small but
significant amendment to the definition of “injury” in workers
compensation legislation in most Australian jurisdictions, which
occurred around the middle of the twentieth century.

The design of this small section, like many others, uses narrative
elements to help frame the law. The verb ‘straddled’ assists in creating
an image that allows the audience to relate to the way compensation law
was developing at the time; the image is of a leg, perhaps uncomfortably,
either side of amendment or the point in time in history when the
amendment was made. The use of the narrative structure allows the law
to take shape. It provides a mechanism to simultaneously contextualise
and justify the dissent. The recognition of these small narratives
within the judgment highlights how the law is not simply a product
of rationality, but rather, a collection of lived experiences. As such, the
law must be approached from many perspectives that the intellectual
perspective cannot always account for. The narrative structure also
demonstrates a mechanism by which the law is able to present itself.
The narrative structure of the judgment is used as a way to cohesively
portray ideas, as the audience is sequentially exposed to the various
elements that underlie the reasoning for the judge’s decision. Identifying
the role of narrative in the structure of this judgment illuminates
the importance of storytelling in understanding and explaining the
law. The fabular structure that exists within the dissent in Comcare is
important because it demonstrates that stories play an essential role
in the formation of a cohesive legal judgment. Gageler J’s ability to
structure the judgment as a story, drawing from the past experiences
of the law in the form of precedent, means that the judgment becomes
more accessible for the audience engaging with it – and which speak to
the realities of the lives of workers required to be away from home for
work for extended periods of time. It creates a sense of understanding
as to the process of reaching the final decision. This is not a sentimental
point. It is simply identifying that there is a need for these storytelling
elements to cohesively portray the decision-making process.
This textual analysis is foundational for a considered of the
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dramaturgical. I now move on to the work I did to theatrically
reconsider the case. For myself, and for a deeper understanding of
the consequences of the new precedent created by the majority, I
proceeded to read the judgment whilst applying different theatrical
techniques of striking out; audience perspective; spontaneity;
interpretive assumptions; emotion; silence; physical barriers; and
physical embodiment.

Striking out: Following the textual analysis, I reappraised the case
by striking out certain elements in paragraph 124 of the judgment,
which describes the fact scenario and principles of the case. MarieAndrée Jacob and Anna Macdonald (2019) have identified the
intricacies that emerge out of the use of a strikethrough. They describe
how it shows a former version of the law that is visible yet no longer
applies. This points to ‘the mutability of law, and to the embodied,
subjective, mortal form of law-making’s effect at the moment of
impact’ (Jacob and MacDonald 2019: 269). For the purposes of this
analysis, the strikethrough was used on various parts of paragraph
124 to identify whether it had an impact on the understanding of the
legal principles being described.
Audience perspective: Crawley and Tranter (2019) identify that there
is a significant difference in understanding legal principles between
criminal lawyers and those observing criminal trials. They describe
how ‘[t]he familiarity of the criminal trial for lawyers obscures that
it is not a familiar nor comfortable space for law’s subjects’ (Crawley
and Tranter 2019: 621). It is easy to fall into the trap of assuming
knowledge that may be perceived as common because of personal
exposure to the law, but is in fact a foreign to people outside of the
legal sphere. They invite the reader to look at law from the outsider’s
perspective, from the perspective not of the legal actors but the legal
audience. With this in mind, I had a colleague, who is not involved
in the law, read the Hatzimanolis principles articulated in paragraphs
124 and 125 of the judgment and highlight the words they thought
were important. I then read the paragraphs myself and highlighted
the words that I thought were important. The intention behind this
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process was to identify the words in which my colleague found to be
important and the words that I found to be important. This was an
attempt to show that, even on a basic level, understandings of what is
important to the law are determined by the way the law is perceived –
and by whom it is perceived.

Spontaneity: Ramshaw (2010) argues that spontaneity is a necessary
component in the deliverance of judgments. She argues that the slight
differences between cases means that ‘each judicial application of
existing rules or past precedents to new facts creates, in fact, a new and
improvised law’ (Ramshaw 2010: 134). The idea of spontaneity within
judgments subverts the traditional notion of precedence. It implies that,
whilst in some ways limited, there is judicial discretion in how previous
principles are applied to new cases. I reappraised Comcare by applying
Ramshaw’s idea of spontaneous improvisation. I took the Hatzimanolis
principles outlined in paragraphs 124 and 125 of the judgment and
compared them to the way that Gageler J applied them in the case.
By doing so, I wanted to expose the fluidity of precedence and, more
broadly, that theatrical techniques of spontaneous improvisation allow
for the re-imagination of these entrenched legal principles.
Interpretive assumptions: In ‘Theatricalising the Law in Three’,
Marett Leiboff (2016) comments on the role that our own perspectives
have when reading, interpreting and understanding the law. She argues
that the way in which we understand legal texts partly relies on the ‘self
and what the self expects’ (Leiboff 2016: 100). I read paragraph 113
of the judgment in my head and then aloud. I noted the words that I
missed when reading the text in my head to when I read it aloud. This
process helped me to understand some of the ‘interpretive assumptions’
(Leiboff 2016:100) that I make when reading. All of us have certain
biases that influence the way we intake different information. The
words that I left out because I did not think that they were important
may be the most meaningful words to another person. The use of this
technique opened up the possibility that there are other ways to read
the paragraphs.
Emotion: Jasreet Badyal stresses the importance of emotion in
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making a legal experience ‘more human’ (2014: 14). In particular,
Badyal asserts that empathy is a crucial component to the judicial
decision-making process. She contends that the legal profession plays
a crucial role ‘in relation to individual clients but also in defining
broader societal norms, especially as future legislators and leaders
in ... communities’ (Badyal 2014: 14). As such, empathy establishes
a way for legal professionals to ‘work with sufficient understanding
of those who will potentially feel [the law’s] impacts’ (Badyal 2014:
15). The introspective effects of empathetic understanding create
an environment wherein the law can ‘see more than just [the legal
professional’s] perspective’ (Badyal 2014: 15). Nicole Rogers explains a
similar idea in her article ‘The Play of Law: Comparing Performances
in Law and Theatre’ (2008). She explains the classical conception
of law and theatre. She outlines that they ‘are perceived as opposite
terms, as a dualism closely associated with the comparable dualism
of work and play’ (Rogers 2008: 429). Rogers then challengers this
traditionalist perspective by identifying that performance, and the
emotions portrayed within performance, can remove the violence that
is imbedded within the legal process. Performance can ‘create a “new
use” for law, and new possibilities for justice’ (Rogers 2008: 443). In
response, I used different tones and emotions when reading paragraphs
113, 114 and 140 of the judgment. I started by reading the paragraphs
in a calm tone followed by a condescending tone and an excited tone.
Each time, I noted the changes in rhythm, pitch and emphasis. The
intention of reappraising the case in this way was to explore how
different emotions expressed through tone create empathy, and the
impact that this has on understanding legal text.
Silence: Sean Mulcahy suggests that silence can help to ‘contour’
meaning ‘incapable of being captured’ (2019: 192) in plain text.
As I read the judgment, I inserted longer pauses at various points
in paragraph 142. By doing so, I wanted to determine whether the
implementation of silence allows the reader to be more reflective on
the subject matter and how this practice of pausing creates meaning
when reading, and understanding, the text. More broadly, I wanted
to assess whether the use of silence has a role in actually changing the
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meaning of legal concepts because of its reflective capacity. What I
found was that silence forces a reader to comprehend the implications
of what has been said because the legal terms in the judgment cannot be
quickly glossed over; the pause slows down the comprehension process.

Physical barriers: I also incorporated some of the elements Oddbird
Theatre developed in their production of Danish Sheikh’s play
Contempt. Namely, I attempted to recreate the second courtroom scene
in this production, wherein the lawyer is trapped within four walls
whilst addressing the Judge. The design of this scene was to intended
bring ‘the audience as close as possible to what it meant to be in the
courtroom’ (Sheikh 2019) and to show how the judges had arrived at
their conclusions. To recreate similar conditions, I read paragraph 139
of the judgment to a colleague whilst I was in the same room. I then
closed the door to the room and repeated the reading from outside.
I wanted to explore how my colleague interpreted the information,
comparing reading the text from inside the room to outside.
Physical embodiment: Finally, abandoning the text, I attempted to
physically represent some of the core ideas mentioned in the Comcare
case. The use of this technique was inspired, in part, by the work done
by Leiboff. Leiboff reinvigorates the ideas of theatre-maker Jerzy
Grotowski, claiming that it was his work that ‘grounds theatrical
jurisprudence’ (Leiboff 2020: 8). Grotowski pushes the law to move
beyond an imagined ideal grounded in Aristotelian drama and tragedy,
and turns to the formation of the legal interpreter as fundamental to
understanding what’s “noticed” or not noticed in law (Leiboff 2020).
Leiboff uses Grotowski’s concepts to advance an idea of “noticing” as
a method to expose the legal situations in which injustices occur and
improve upon them. This is not, however, simply a practice of reading
and noticing. Interestingly, Leiboff points to a greater purpose of
theatricalising the law. Theatre uses the body. The body instinctually
reacts to different situations; its response exists prior to the intellectual
perspective. Bodily response is ‘that “step before” that helps us to
notice because no amount of thinking can bring liveliness and lifeworld into play’ (Leiboff 2020: 138). Leiboff concludes that it is this
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instinctual reaction of the body that provides jurisprudents with fresh
perspectives to re-assess their understandings of the law. With these
ideas in mind, I tried to physically embody the concepts of precedence,
court hierarchy and the Hatzimanolis principles. Once I had created a
movement for each concept, I took a photo. This process allowed me to
explore the components of these ideas that I realised spontaneously in
my body without thinking critically. I was able to explore how my body
reacted to the thought of these ideas, and what this might mean for
my understanding of these important principles that underlie the law.
This has been a brief overview of the dramaturgical practices used
to explore this judgment, ranging from conventional textual analysis
to radical physical embodiment. In what follows, I will analyse the
findings from these dramaturgical practices as they apply to the case.
4 Analysis of theory and practice applied to the case
The textual analysis of the dissent exposed the way precedents act as
stories to contextually justify the decisions that the judge has made. In
this section, I explore dramaturgical and theatrical techniques that can
provide a deeper understanding of the judgment.
A Striking out
Applying the strike-through technique examined by Jacob and
Macdonald (2019), in paragraph 124, I struck out a number of words
and phrases to determine whether this would have an impact on the
understanding the text. Figure 1, below, shows the augmentations that
I made to the paragraph.

Figure 1.

I chose the word ‘affirmative’ because it qualifies the sentences that
it is a part of. For example, in the first instance of its use it characterises
the principles in Hatzimanolis. I also chose to strike out the phrases
‘near where he lived in employer provided accommodation within a
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camp’ and ‘with his employer’s encouragement’ because, as they are
independent clauses, they provide contextual information for the
rest of the sentence. As a result of this process, the meaning of the
text significantly changed. There was no qualification of the answers
provided by the Hatzimanolis case and there was less contextual
information to support the deduction of the principles. Whilst the
strikethrough technique was used in a different way to the analysis
of Jacob and Macdonald, it demonstrated some important elements
embedded within legal text. It supports the use of storytelling within
the production of judgments. Without contextual information, the
meaning of the principles becomes less impactful because they have
no point of reference. The contextual elements in this passage help to
ground the principles in reality. It also shows the importance of different
words within the legal lexicon. It is difficult to understand just how
impactful individual words are until they are taken away. In this case,
the removal of the word ‘affirmative’ markedly changes the perception
of the answers provided in the Hatzimanolis case. Without context
and qualifiers, judgments have lesser meaning. This was, however, a
selective process. I was striking through text that I, as a person trained
in law, deemed unnecessary. It was necessary next to consider how a
legal outsider might approach the text.
B Audience perspective
The idea that there are clear distinctions between the way legal
professionals and people outside the law interact with legal proceedings
(Crawley and Tranter 2019) was another important tool used to
reappraise this case. To explore this idea, I had a colleague of mine,
not involved in law, read paragraphs 124 and 125 and highlight the
words that she found important when reading. I followed the same
process. Below, Figure 2 represents the words that my colleague found
to be important in the text and Figure 3 are the words I thought were
important within the text.
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Figure 2.

Figure 3.
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Following this process, I asked my colleague a very simple
question: why did you highlight those specific words within the text?
My colleague gave me a very structured answer. She said that the
words that she highlighted in paragraph 124 were contextual. They
allowed her to understand the facts surrounding Hatzimanolis and
this provided a starting point to isolate the legal reasoning in the
subsequent paragraph. She then explained that the words ‘incidental’,
‘employment’, and ‘considerations of time, place and circumstance’ in
paragraph 125 established the reasons why Hatzimanolis has the ability
to claim compensation.
Similarly, in my own reading, I found that the specific facts in
paragraph 124 were helpful to understand the meaning of Hatzimanolis.
However, taking the facts for granted, I highlighted what I thought
to be the crux of the paragraph – that workers’ compensation can be
claimed if ‘the injury was sustained “during an interval occurring within
an overall period ... of work and while ... engaged with [the] employer’s
encouragement …”’ In paragraph 125, I immediately identified the
elements that constitute a workplace injury and the considerations that
create the incidental connection between the injury and the person’s
employment.

The most identifiable difference between the highlighted sections
in these paragraphs is the understanding of the principles and how
they are constituted. Whilst my colleague recognised that there were
some elements necessary to constituting ‘injury … in the course of
employment’, she did not recognise how the overriding principles were
applied. I have only developed the skill to be able to coherently recognise
and apply these principles because of my exposure to the law. This
process identified two important facts. First, it identified that the law
can be perceived very differently according to the audience. Obviously,
those exposed to its peculiarities more frequently begin to learn how
it operates and the legalese becomes almost mundane. For those not so
accustomed, it can be a disorienting. Perhaps by realising this and by
understanding that the perception of the law is heavily dependant on the
subjectivity of its audience, we can strive to make the law more accessible
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to outsiders. Second, however, this process identified a commonality
between my colleague and myself: that facts are always important. These
stories are what constitute precedent and, subsequently, the principles
used in the judgment. They are important for contextualisation as well
as understanding how and when certain rules are applied. As such,
we should recognise the power that narratives have within the law
and respect their impact on understanding, interpreting and applying
these complex rules. Narratives are not limited to the fictional. They
can play an important role in explaining even the most complex legal
ideas. Framing the judge as a storyteller that weaves narratives from
the stories told during proceedings in one way to think through the
act of judgment; another is to see the judge as a creative spontaneous
improviser, moulding precedent to the scenarios of the case.
C Spontaneity
Using Ramshaw’s (2010) concept of ‘spontaneity’, I reappraised the
case by exploring the difference between the Hatzimanolis principles
and how they were applied in Comcare. In paragraph 124, Gageler J
explains that the Hatzimanolis principle states that a person can claim
compensation if:
[t]he injury was sustained “during an interval occurring within an
overall period or episode of work and while [the worker was] engaged,
with his employer’s encouragement, in an activity which his employer
had organised.”

In paragraph 159, Gageler J further explains that the claimant
is entitled to compensation in accordance with the Hatzimanolis
principles. He describes that PVYW is entitled to compensation
because she ‘was at a place (sufficiently identified for the purposes of
the case as the motel) at which her employer had encouraged her to
be.’ This is a fairly straightforward application of the principles to the
case at hand.
However, spontaneity does play a small, yet important, role in the
judgment. The application of the rules has been tailored to the case. In
the final line of paragraph 159, Gageler J states that: ‘[t]he particular
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activity in which the respondent was engaged at the time she was
injured does not enter into the analysis.’ This is an important statement
because it expands the scope of the Hatzimanolis principles in a way that
the majority was unwilling to. By simply comparing the Hatzimanolis
principles to how Gageler J applied them to the case, spontaneity within
this judgment became apparent. This improvisation by Gageler J would
not have come about without the controversy surrounding PVYW’s
conduct in this case. Thus, the specifics of each case slightly alter the
application of the principles each time they are applied. This idea of the
judge as a spontaneous improviser shows that precedent is somewhat
fluid and partly relies on a judge’s impulsive discretion. Against the
idea of precedent as rigid, spontaneous improvisation promotes the
idea that the applicant of precedent necessarily includes an element of
flexibility to maintain the law’s relevance, especially as the law is applied
to different situations at, in some instances, very different periods of
time. It provides a mechanism to maintain the law’s relevancy. This is a
re-imagination of the idea of precedence, and it shows the importance
of dramaturgical or theatrical techniques in reading and applying legal
text. It also invites the attention to the way that audiences to the law
and readers of legal judgments interpret these improvisations.
D Interpretive assumptions
To test Leiboff ’s thesis that the way in which we understand legal texts
partly relies on the ‘self and what the self expects’ (2016:100), I read
the text of the judgment aloud and identified words that I skipped over
when reading it in my head. In paragraph 113, I noticed that I missed
‘rather’ in the last line. The full paragraph reads:
Hatzimanolis has stood for over 20 years. It has been applied on
countless occasions by courts and tribunals throughout Australia. There
is no challenge to its continuing authority. The appeal turns rather
on the nature, content and application of the principles it expressed.

When reading judgments, the text is quite dense. Often, I will
leave out words that I unconsciously do not deem necessary. I viewed
‘rather’ as nothing more than an adverb to indicate preference. It does
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serve this function, but by missing it, the meaning of the sentence
is significantly altered. In this instance, the term is very important
because the word ‘rather’ helps bind the judge’s view on the absolute
authority of Hatzimanolis, and stresses that the issue before the Court
is distinct and focused on the context of the present case. This is an
important distinction that I missed because of my own assumptions
about the importance of certain words. I also noticed in this reading
that my understanding of the paragraph was clearer when I read the
text out loud. The full stops and the syllabic flow of the phrases became
more apparent and this assisted me in understanding the meaning of
the paragraph. Verbalisation is an important tool for understanding
text because it makes you read every word. It exposed ideas that I did
not properly understand because I could not just gloss over them in my
head. I also started to pick up on how the tone of my voice impacted
my reception of the text.
E Emotion
Continuing on with the reading aloud of the text, I found that the
use of varying emotions and tones when reading paragraphs 113, 114
and 140 changed the way the information in these paragraphs was
perceived. I read the paragraphs calmly then condescendingly and
then excitedly. When I read the paragraphs condescendingly, I found
that my rhythm became disjointed and this affected my concentration
and understanding of the text. Conversely, when I read the paragraphs
in an excited tone, my pace increased and my pitch elevated, but
despite this, the text was more approachable because it was as if I
was convincing myself that it was important. It was as though the
condescending tone turned me away and the excited tone invited me to
the text. Reading with emotion also had a profound impact on the way
I empathised with the text. For example, I felt as though I was more
inclined to consider the implications of the text when I was excited
because I was more engaged with it, whereas I felt more disengaged
from the text when reading it in a condescending tone. The joy in
the excited delivery provided a more empathetic connection with the

131

Ryan Roberts

text. The emotions were manufactured and not the actual experience
of calmness, condescension or excitement. However, the use of this
theatrical technique of the read through suggests the possibility of
empathy promoting a new understanding of the law – one that does
not view emotion as the law’s antithesis. Simply accepting the fact that
emotion plays an important role within the delivery of legal judgments
reveals the possibility of understanding and delivering the law and
legal text in new ways and through different emotions.
F Silence
I continued my read-through, and began to explore the use of silence.
In paragraph 142, following the phrases ending in ‘law’ and ‘reasoning’,
I implemented a pause of 4-5 seconds, as follows:
Appeal or review of the application of a statutory standard or criterion
to the facts of a particular case in the context of workers compensation
legislation is now, and almost always has been, limited to appeal or
review on a question of law. [Pause] Whether a particular evaluative
judgment is reasonably open on the facts of a particular case is a
question of law. [Pause] So too is whether a particular evaluation
judgment has been reached by a legally permissible process of
reasoning. [Pause]

The added pauses had an interesting effect on the way the text
was presented. It broke up each sentence into its own small part and
the few extra seconds meant that I could understand what was being
said. It added a kind of structure to the paragraph by making each
of the discussed aspects more identifiable. The pauses also forced me
to think about each specific part of the paragraph. The extra time for
consideration assisted my understanding of the paragraph because it
forced me to consider what I had just read. As discussed by Mulcahy,
silence acted as a way of contouring meaning within the paragraph.
Though on a smaller scale, pausing assisted my comprehension of the
paragraph because it forced a kind of self-reflection at various points
in the paragraph.
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G Physical barriers
I continued on with my read-through, now exploring how physical
separation affected how the information was interpreted. I read
paragraph 139 of the judgment to a colleague whilst I was in the same
room and then closed the door to the room and repeated the reading
from outside. The purpose of this exercise was to compare how reading
the text from inside the room versus outside affected my colleague’s
interpretation of the information, as well as to explore the impact of
the physical barrier created by the door. This technique, although in a
crude way, was an attempt to show the exclusivity of the law. Sheikh
(2019) points out that the door being shut represents the ‘tangles of
legal discourse that [lawyers find themselves] having to wade through.’
An unfortunate aspect of the law is that, in some instances, it can be
inherently exclusive because of the complexity of its ideas. The door
being shut symbolises some of these barriers and physically embodies
some of the issues that people outside of the legal sphere face when
confronting the law and legal text. Interestingly, my colleague noted
that it was actually easier to understand the information without the
distraction of my facial expressions. I also wanted to see whether my
reading changed as a result of being, or not being, in company with my
audience. Again, interestingly, I found the text easier to read out aloud
when not in the presence of company.
This might point to some assumptions that we make about the
presentation of law. Perhaps, when in company, there is an assumption
that the law needs to be presented in a particular way to convey its
importance, which creates acute pressure on the legal performer. From
my colleague’s perspective, perhaps it was the performative elements of
my presentation of the judgment, including my facial expressions, which
distracted from the dialogue and the information that it conveyed.
The experiment also demonstrated the effect of live presence on legal
performance – and the way that the legal performer and the audience
respond to bodily co-presence.
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H Physical embodiment
Finally, continuing on my exploration of law through the body, I
adopted a more abstract technique of physically embodying the
concepts of precedence, court hierarchy, and the Hatzimanolis principles,
which changed the way I viewed these concepts. For this section of
the exploration, I spontaneously embodied each of these concepts,
drawing from Leiboff ’s (2020) idea that the body instinctually reacts
without knowing – and that this instinctual reaction can be revealing.
The photos below are the results.
Figure 4, below, shows the physical representation of precedence.

Figure 4

The straight arms represent a timeline and each of the hands is a
case. The previous case is shadowing the present. This process broadened
my assumptions about precedence because the bodily experience meant
that I had to think about it from a different perspective that grounded
the idea within physical reality. It made me consider the reasoning
behind the choice of the pose. This was an instinctual, spontaneous
reaction to the thought of precedence. The conclusion that I reached
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was that I view the role of precedence as a narrative tool that builds
on itself to maintain the law’s effectiveness and relevance when being
applied. Previous case law shadows the current case being decided. It is
through this process that the law is able to develop in a cohesive – and,
as my arms suggest, linear – way.
Figure 5, below, shows the physical representation of court hierarchy.

Figure 5

The triangular shape of my arms indicates the structure of the
court system. It starts with the local courts, which is the wide base of
the triangle, and works its way up to the High Court. As you move up
the triangle, the space gets progressively smaller; just as when you go
up the court hierarchy, the number of courts gets smaller. The shape
of the triangle also represents the importance of different courts, with
the High Court, sitting at the top of the court hierarchy, holding the
most power. The shape of the triangle also indicates a top-down effect
wherein the top trickles down to each of the lower levels, reflecting
the operation of precedence in a hierarchal court system. What
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this embodiment demonstrated was the assumed importance that I
instinctually place in the High Court as the highest court in the land,
sitting at the apex of the triangle, and handing down judgments that
set a precedent for the courts below, and how this legal learning has
trained its way into my body.
Finally, figure 6, below, is the physical representation of the Hatzimanolis
principles.

Figure 6

This image is a bit more complex because of the various elements of
the Hatzimanolis principles. The clasping of my arm with my right-hand
is to indicate an injury. The left-hand reaching out is to symbolise me
reaching out for something, something being offered, and me taking
that offer. It was an attempt to show a kind of encouragement or
inducement on the part of the employer. Obviously, there is a temporal
component to the Hatzimanolis principles, namely that the injury must
be sustained ‘during an interval occurring within an overall period
or episode of work.’ However, due to the complexity of the temporal
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element of the principles, I found it difficult to embody this element.
What this demonstrated more broadly is that complex legal principles
are difficult to embody. It is seemingly simple to represent injury and,
to lesser extent, the idea of inducement by an employer; however, it is
more difficult to represent the temporal connection to work required
under Hatzimanolis. The challenge with embodying this aspect of
the Hatzimanolis principles may indicate that there is a challenge in
explaining and applying the principles in practice.

The process of physically embodying these esoteric concepts
produced a profound impact. It made me re-consider the way that I
viewed these ideas because it grounded them within physical reality. It
made me understand the law through feeling. All of these concepts have
been constructed, and here they have been re-constructed through the
body and made human. Moreover, creating these poses was instinctual.
Whilst it was difficult to determine the meaning behind the poses,
and why my body moved in the way it did, it was as though my body
understood these ideas before my mind could explain them.
In summary, I applied a variety of dramaturgical and theatrical
techniques to analyse and explore the case in question. In what follows,
I will offer a critical account of this workshopping process, reflections,
and then conclusions on what was uncovered through the dramaturgical
and theatrical approach to the case.
5 Account of the workshopping process
The workshopping process exposed some issues, and complexities, that
I had not properly considered at the outset of this case analysis. In this
section, I will consider issues and complexities raised by some of the
dramaturgical and theatrical techniques utilised.

Another difficulty that I encountered was during the emotional
reading of paragraphs 113, 114 and 140. I intended to dramaturgically
analyse these paragraphs by reading them with different emotions based
on Badyal’s (2014) work on the importance of emotion in creating
empathy amongst those in a position to impact the application of law.
It was, however, difficult to produce genuine emotions of condescension
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and excitement. Subsequently, the reading felt forced. I was not really
feeling those emotions, only imitating them in my tone and pitch.
This meant that the impact that the emotion had on the text was not
genuine and, therefore, it was difficult to objectively determine the
impact that these emotions might have on reading the text. Further,
complexities arose when striking out and highlighting elements of
paragraphs 124 and 125. Both methods of dramaturgical analysis
required considerable thought when determining why certain parts of
a paragraph were highlighted or changed. Sometimes, it was difficult
to determine whether there was genuine meaning behind the act of
highlighting or striking through in the analysis of the alterations.
In some ways, the ex post facto analysis of the act of highlighting or
striking through also moved away from the intention of this article. It
required critical thought and relied less on my bodily reaction. On this,
while I was reappraising paragraph 142 by adding pauses, I noticed
an interesting pattern. I was naturally placing the pauses at the end of
sentences. Doing this helped me to understand the sentences and gave
me more time to consider what was being said. Conversely, placing
pauses randomly may have an adverse impact on understanding because
the text would become disjointed. My instinctual bodily reaction of
pausing at particularly times revealed how silence can give space for
contemplation.
Similarly, the physical embodiment of precedent, court hierarchy,
and the Hatzimanolis principles was another section of the reappraisal
that was successful. It compelled me to understand abstract ideas
in a physical way. It showed me that the body could go beyond
the intellect in understanding and representing complex matters.
However, it was very difficult to physically embody concepts that had a
multitude of moving parts. For example, I managed to create a physical
representation of injury and inducement but I found it difficult to
incorporate the temporal element of the Hatzimanolis principles. This
was for two reasons. Firstly, I am limited by the physicality of my body.
Since I am using both of my hands in Figure 6, I do not have any more
tools to embody any more of the elements; my body could only convey
so much. Secondly, time is a vague concept. I could not come up with
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a definitive way of showing it in a single movement captured in the still
frame of a photo. Perhaps, if I were to conduct this reappraisal again,
I would take multiple photos or incorporate less still and more fluid
movements. This would shift the physical embodiment from developing
a movement to instead developing a pattern of movement to embody
legal concepts and ideas.
Having considered the issues and complexities raised by different
theatrical and dramaturgical techniques, in the next section, I will
provide some reflections on the process.
6 Reflections
As a student of the law, I seldom saw the value in looking at the law
beyond the words on the page – of the judgment, the statute, or some
other legal text. This dramaturgical process instead allowed me to
experience complex ideas of law through my body. This challenged my
assumption that the law can only be understood through an intellectual
perspective. It highlighted the importance of bodily experience in
understanding and interpreting the law and it forced me to expand my
understanding of the law beyond what I was being told in the text. It
also made me question some of the preconceived understandings that
I had about different legal concepts; concepts that are almost always
portrayed as being objective and ruled by rationality. This process
proved to me that humanness – the human body – plays a pivotal role
in the functioning of the law.

Through the process of reading through the judgment and letting
the words play off my tongue, I noticed the significant difference in
my understanding of the text from reading it to myself compared with
reading it aloud. When I read the text out loud I could feel the rhythm
and syntactical structure, which helped establish meaning. What I also
found was that emotion plays a significant role in the delivery of the law,
despite my initial belief that the objectivity of the law is ‘antithetical’
(Ramshaw 2010) to emotion. It became clear that the presentation of
the law can be intimidating or inviting simply based on the kind of
emotion you use to read and deliver the text. With this in mind, the way
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we deliver the law must be empathetic (Badyal 2014); that is, it must
understand the feelings of others. A lawyer has a responsibility to ensure
that their client feels heard for, without fostering this relationship, the
lawyer is failing their client. Equally important is the realisation that
the law has the ability to impact everyone. Empathy can act as a bridge
between the esoteric concepts of the law and those who are affected by
its application; emotion can act as a passage to humanise the law and
ground it within its social context.
This made me reflect on the type of law or legal text that is being
assessed. In this analysis, it is a judgment. This means that it is designed
to be presented to other people through the act of reading. It is very
different from the way that legislation is structured; it has a narrative
flow to it. Throughout this process I have reflected on the importance
of storytelling in the law. Precedent, and the construction of judgments,
relies heavily on narratives – the story is set up in a chronological fashion
to justify the conclusions that are made at the end. Legal practitioners
need to be aware of the power that narratives have in the law and to use
them effectually to serve justice. Without realising their importance,
and the gravity that stories carry within the legal process, serious
injustices may occur. Lawyers also need to be able to actively look
beyond their own experiences to be able to truly understand the effect
of the law. Bodily experiences of the kind practiced here personalise the
law and develop the capability to perceive outside perspectives. Without
this process of bodily experience, the ‘conditions of injustice’ (Leiboff
2018: 363) proliferate as legal practitioners become disconnected from
the real effect of the law.
7 Conclusion
To conclude, this dramaturgical and theatrical approach to case analysis
has uncovered some interesting realisations about the law. Factors such
as emotion, physicality and storytelling are all involved in the legal
process. Therefore, to comprehend the law, various perspectives need to
be used that go beyond the intellectual and into the body. Whilst the
intellectual perspective has been important for the development and
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practice of the law, it is through these alternate perspectives that we can
realise new mechanisms that change the way that we think about the
law. To practice law as a purely intellectual exercise detaches law from
its primary audience – society. Whether it be through overly prolix
language or esoteric ideas that riddle legislation and judgment, the law
has become so complex with so many barriers to its effective use by
outsiders that it seems, over time, the law has forgotten that, ultimately,
it is a function of society. Theatre theory and practice catches the, at
times, superfluous complexity of the law and grounds it in a reality that
we can all understand. It is not the antithesis to the law. As this analysis
has shown, alternate theatrical ways of thinking and doing law may
lead to greater justice because theatre acts as a counterbalance to some
of the barriers to law created by the intellectual perspective. To draw on
an example, the physical embodiment of legal concepts has significant
benefits in re-imagining legal concepts. Although embodiment is a
personal interpretation, it creates new perspectives that the intellectual
perspective cannot conceive. More importantly, it challenges the rigid
conceptions that are imposed by the intellectual. All legal practitioners
are taught the same meaning for the elements of the law. For example,
precedent is a case that has achieved a binding status in the common
law. Theatre theory and practice allows practitioners and thinkers of
the law to challenge these ideas and it is through challenge that change
is affected. This kind of change can lead to a better application of the
law in society. This not only serves the legal system itself, but also, the
people that engage with it.
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Endnotes
1

Ryan Roberts is a Solicitor at Watkins Tapsell Solicitors, Australia.
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